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Abstract
King and Saia were the first to break the quadratic word complexity bound for Byzantine Agreement
in synchronous systems against an adaptive adversary, and Algorand broke this bound with near-
optimal resilience (first in the synchronous model and then with eventual-synchrony). Yet the
question of asynchronous sub-quadratic Byzantine Agreement remained open. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to answer this question in the affirmative. A key component of our
solution is a shared coin algorithm based on a VRF. A second essential ingredient is VRF-based
committee sampling, which we formalize and utilize in the asynchronous model for the first time.
Our algorithms work against a delayed-adaptive adversary, which cannot perform after-the-fact
removals but has full control of Byzantine processes and full information about communication in
earlier rounds. Using committee sampling and our shared coin, we solve Byzantine Agreement with
high probability, with a word complexity of O˜(n) and O(1) expected time, breaking the O(n2) bit
barrier for asynchronous Byzantine Agreement.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms; Theory of
computation → Cryptographic primitives; Mathematics of computing → Probabilistic algorithms
Keywords and phrases shared coin, Byzantine Agreement, VRF, sub-quadratic consensus protocol
1 Introduction
Byzantine Agreement (BA) [23] has been studied for four decades by now, but until recently,
has been considered at a fairly small scale. In recent years, however, we begin to see practical
use-cases of BA in large-scale systems, which motivates a push for reduced communication
complexity. In deterministic algorithms, Dolev and Reischuk’s renown lower bound stipulates
that Ω(n2) communication is needed [14], and until fairly recently, almost all randomized
solutions have also had (expected) quadratic word complexity. Recent work has broken this
barrier [19, 17, 27], but not in asynchronous settings. We present here the first sub-quadratic
asynchronous Byzantine Agreement algorithm. Our algorithm is randomized and solves
binary BA with high probability (whp), i.e., with probability that tends to 1 as n goes to
infinity.
We consider a system with a static set of n processes, in the so-called “permissioned”
setting, where the ids of all processes are well-known. Our algorithm tolerates f failures for
n ≈ 8.6f (asymptotically). In addition, we assume a trusted public key infrastructure (PKI)
that allows us to use verifiable random functions (VRFs) [25].
We assume a strong adversary that can adaptively take over processes, whereupon it has
full access to their private data. It further sees all communication in the system. But we
do limit the adversary in two ways. First, we assume that it is computationally bounded
so that we may use the PKI. Second, as proven in [1] for the synchronous model, achieving
sub-quadratic complexity is impossible when the adversary can perform after-the-fact removal,
meaning that it can delete messages that were sent by correct processes before corrupting
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these processes. Here, we adapt the no after-the-fact removal assumption to the asynchronous
model, and define a delayed-adaptive adversary based on causality [22].
We formalize the concept of VRF-based committee sampling as used in Algorand [17, 12],
and adapt it to the asynchronous model. In a nutshell, the idea is to use a VRF seeded with
each process’s private key in order to sample uniformly at random O(log(n)) processes for
a committee, and to have different committees execute different parts of the BA protocol.
Each committee is used for sending exactly one protocol message and messages are sent
only by committee members, thus reducing the communication cost. Whereas in Algorand’s
synchronous model a process can be sure it receives messages from all correct committee
members by a timeout, in the asynchronous model this is not the case. Rather, processes
make progress by waiting for some threshold number of messages. Without committees, this
threshold is normally n−f (waiting for more than n−f processes might violate termination).
But since committees are randomly sampled, we do not know the committee’s exact size
or the number of Byzantine processes in it. Thus, adapting committees to this model is
somewhat subtle and requires ensuring certain conditions regarding the intersection of subsets
of committees. In this paper we identify sufficient conditions on sampling, which ensure
safety and liveness with high probability.
Randomized BA algorithms can be seen as if processes toss a random coin at some point
during the protocol. While some protocols toss a local coin [7, 9] and require exponential
expected time to reach agreement, others use the abstraction of a shared coin, which involves
communication among processes and results in the same coin toss with some well defined
success rate [28, 11, 10, 17, 20]. In this work we present an asynchronous shared coin
algorithm that uses a VRF and provides a constant success rate with an equal probability for
tossing 0 and 1. Unlike previous shared coin implementations, our solution does not require
a priori knowledge of the set of participants, which makes it useful in committee-based
constructions. We then adapt our coin to work with committees and use it to devise a
sub-quadratic BA algorithm.
In summary, this paper presents the first formalization of randomly sampled committees
using cryptography in asynchronous settings. Based on this technique, it presents the first
sub-quadratic asynchronous shared coin and BA whp algorithms. Our algorithms have
expected O˜(n) word complexity and O(1) expected time.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model;
Section 3 reviews related work. In Section 4, we present our shared coin algorithm and
in Section 5, we formalize committee sampling. Then, in Section 6, we use the coin and
the committee sampling to construct a BA whp algorithm. We end with some concluding
remarks in Section 7.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a distributed system consisting of a well-known static set Π of n processes and
a delayed-adaptive adversary (see definition below). The adversary may adaptively corrupt
up to f = ( 13 − )n processes in the course of a run, where max{ 2ln(n) , 0.217} <  < 13 . A
corrupted process is Byzantine; it may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. In particular,
it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, and send arbitrary messages. As long as a
process is not corrupted by the adversary, it is correct and follows the protocol.
Delayed-adaptive adversary. In the synchronous model, one defines a late adver-
sary [29, 21, 6, 3], which at the beginning of round r, can observe the state of the system at
the beginning of round r− 1. This assumption prevents “after-the-fact” removals of messages
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sent by processes before being taken over by the adversary [1, 17], as required for achieving
a sub-quadratic communication cost. We adapt this assumption to the asynchronous model.
Since in asynchronous models the natural order between messages is Lamport’s happens-
before relation [22], we use the notion of causality instead of ‘rounds’ to define what messages
the adversary may observe when scheduling other messages. We denote by m→ m′ the fact
that m causally precedes m′. The adversary is formally defined as follows:
I Definition 1 (delayed-adaptive adversary). The delayed-adaptive adversary may adaptively
corrupt up to f processes over the course of a run and schedules all messages. The adversary
has full access to corrupted processes’ private information and can observe all communication,
but it can use the contents of a message m sent by a correct process for scheduling a message
m′ only if m→ m′. In addition, if m and m′ originate at the same process, then m′ cannot
be scheduled to be delivered before m, at any process.
Cryptographic tools. We assume a trusted PKI, where private and public keys for the
processes are generated before the protocol begins and processes cannot manipulate their
public keys. In addition, we assume that the adversary is computationally bounded, meaning
that it cannot obtain the private keys of processes unless it corrupts them. Furthermore, we
assume that the PKI is in place from the outset. (Recall that we assume a permissioned
setting, so the public keys of the n processes are well-known). These assumptions allow us
to use verifiable random functions, as we now define.
A verifiable random function (VRF) is a pseudorandom function that provides a proof of
its correct computation [25]. Given a secret key sk, one can evaluate the VRF on any input
x and obtain a pseudorandom output y together with a proof pi, i.e., 〈y, pi〉 = VRFsk(x).
From pi and the corresponding public key pk, one can verify that y is correctly computed
from x and sk using the function VRF-Verpk(x, 〈y, pi〉). Additionally, a VRF needs to satisfy
uniqueness. More formally, a VRF guarantees the following properties:
Pseudorandomness: for any x, it is infeasible to distinguish y = VRFsk(x) from a
uniformly random value without access to sk.
Verifiability: VRF-Verpk(x,VRFsk(x)) = true.
Uniqueness: it is infeasible to find x, y1, y2, pi1, pi2 such that y1 6= y2 but VRF-Verpk(x,-
〈y1, pi1〉) = VRF-Verpk(x, 〈y2, pi2〉) = true.
Efficient constructions for VRFs have been described in the literature [13, 16].
Communication. We assume that every pair of processes is connected via a reliable
link. Messages are authenticated in the sense that if a correct process pi receives a message
m indicating that m was sent by a correct process pj , then m was indeed generated by pj
and sent to pi. The network is asynchronous, i.e., there is no bound on message delays.
Complexity. We use the following standard complexity notions [2, 26]. While measuring
complexity, we allow a word to contain a signature, a VRF output, or a value from a finite
domain. We define the duration of an execution as the longest sequence of messages that are
causally related in this execution until all correct processes decide. We measure the expected
word communication complexity of our protocols as the maximum of the expected total
number of words sent by correct processes and the expected running time of our protocol as
the maximum of the expected duration. In both cases the maximum is computed over all
inputs and applicable adversaries and expectation is taken over the random VRF outputs.
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Table 1 Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement algorithms.
Protocol n > Adversary Word complexity Termination Safety
Ben-Or [7] 5f adaptive O(2n) w.p. 1 X
Rabin [28] 10f adaptive O(n2) w.p. 1 X
Bracha [8] 3f adaptive O(2n) w.p. 1 X
Cachin et al. [10] 3f adaptive O(n2) w.p. 1 X
King-Saia [20] 400f adaptive polynomial whp X
MMR [26] 3f adaptive O(n2) w.p. 1 X
Our protocol ≈ 8.6f delayed-adaptive O˜(n) whp whp
3 Related Work
Lower bounds. Our assumptions conform with a number of known bounds. Deterministic
consensus is impossible in an asynchronous system if even one process may crash (by FLP [15])
and requires Ω(n2) communication even in synchronous systems [14]. As for randomized
Byzantine Agreement, Abraham et al. [1] state that disallowing after-the-fact removal is
necessary even in synchronous settings for achieving sub-quadratic communication.
Asynchronous BA and shared coin algorithms. The algorithms we present in this
paper belong to the family of asynchronous BA algorithms, which sacrifice determinism in
order to circumvent FLP. We compare our solutions to existing ones in Table 1.
Ben-Or [7] suggested a protocol with resilience n > 5f . This protocol uses a local coin
(namely, a local source of randomness) and its expected time complexity is exponential
(or constant if f = O(
√
n)). Bracha [8] improved the resilience to n > 3f with the same
complexity. The complexity can be greatly reduced by replacing the local coin with a shared
one with a guaranteed success rate.
Later works presented the shared coin abstraction and used it to solve BA with O(n2)
communication. Rabin [28] was the first to do so, suggesting a protocol with resilience
n > 10f and a constant expected number of rounds. Cachin et al. [10] were the first to use
a shared coin to solve BA with O(n2) communication and optimal resilience. Mostefaoui
et al. [26] then presented a signature-free BA algorithm with optimal resilience and O(n2)
messages that uses a shared coin abstraction as a black box; the shared coin algorithm we
provide in Section 4 can be used to instantiate this protocol. All of the aforementioned
algorithms solve binary BA, where the processes’ initial values are 0 and 1; a recent work
solved multi-valued BA with the same O(n2) word complexity [2].
BA algorithms also differ in the cryptographic assumptions they make and the cryp-
tographic tools they use. Rabin’s coin [28] is based on cryptographic secret sharing [30].
Some later works followed suit, and used cryptographic abstractions such as threshold
signatures [2, 10]. Other works forgo cryptography altogether and instead consider a
full information model, where there are no restrictions on the adversary’s computational
power [11, 20]. In this model, the problem is harder, and existing works achieve very low
resilience [20] (n > 400f) or high communication complexity [11]. In this paper we do use
cryptographic primitives. We assume a computationally bounded adversary and rely on the
abstraction of a VRF [25]. VRFs were previously used in blockchain protocols [17, 18, 4] and
were also used by Micali [24] to construct a shared coin in the synchronous model.
Committees. We use committees in order to reduce the word complexity and allow
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each step of the protocol to be executed by only a fraction of the processes. King and Saia
used a similar concept and presented the first sub-quadratic BA protocol in the synchronous
model [19]. Algorand proposed a synchronous algorithm [17] (and later extended it to
eventual synchrony [12]) where committees are sampled randomly using a VRF. Each process
executes a local computation to sample itself to a committee, and hence the selection of
processes does not require interaction among them. We follow this approach in this paper
and adapt the technique to the asynchronous model.
4 Shared Coin
We describe here an asynchronous protocol for a shared coin with a constant success rate
against the delayed-adaptive adversary. We assume that for every r ∈ N, shared_coin(r) is
invoked by all correct processes and that the invocation of shared_coin(r) by some process p
is causally independent of its progress at other processes. The definition of a shared coin is
given below.
I Definition 2 (Shared Coin). A shared coin with success rate ρ is a shared object that gener-
ates an infinite sequence of binary outputs. For each execution of the procedure shared_coin(r)
with r ∈ N, all correct processes output b with probability at least ρ, for any value b ∈ {0, 1}.
The pseudo-code for our shared coin is presented in Algorithm 1. Our protocol is composed
of two phases of messages passing. Each process first samples the VRF with its private key
and the protocol’s argument in order to generate a random initial value. For brevity, we
denote by V RFi the VRF with pi’s private key. Using a VRF to generate a random initial
value effectively weakens the adversary as Byzantine processes can neither choose their initial
values nor equivocate. If a Byzantine process would try to act maliciously, the VRF proof
would easily expose it and its message would be ignored.
In each phase of the protocol, each process sends one value to every other process. The
receiver validates the received values using the VRF proofs, which are sent along with
the values. We omit the proof validation from the code for clarity. After two phases of
communication, each process chooses the minimum value it received in the second phase and
outputs its least significant bit. We follow the concept of a common core, as presented by
Attiya and Welch for the crash failure model [5], and argue that if a core of f + 1 correct
processes hold the global minimum value at the end of phase 1, then by the end of the
following phase all processes receive this value. We exploit the  parameter in our resilience
definition to bound the number of values held by f + 1 correct processes. We show that
this number is linear in n and hence with a constant positive probability, by the end of the
second phase, all correct processes receive the global minimum among the VRF outputs and
therefore produce the same output.
We now prove that the shared coin has a constant success rate. We say that a value v is
common if at least f + 1 correct processes receive v by the end of phase 1. Denote by c be
the number of different common values. The next two lemmas give a lower bound on c and
on the probability that the global minimum among the VRF outputs is common.
I Lemma 3. In Algorithm 1, c ≥ 91+6n.
Proof. In a given run of the algorithm, define a table T with n rows and n columns, where
for each correct process pi and each 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, T [i, j] = 1 iff pi receives 〈first, v〉 from
pj before sending the second message in line 8. Each row of a correct process contains exactly
n− f ones since it waits for n− f 〈first, v〉 messages (line 7). Each row of a faulty process
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Algorithm 1 Protocol shared_coin(r): code for process pi
1: Initially first-set, second-set = ∅
2: vi ← VRFi(r)
3: send 〈first, vi〉 to all processes
4: upon receiving 〈first, vj〉 with valid
vj from pj do
5: if vj < vi then vi ← vj
6: first-set← first-set ∪ {j}
7: when |first-set| = n− f for the first
time
8: send 〈second, vi〉 to all processes
9: upon receiving 〈second, vj〉 with
valid vj from pj do
10: if vj < vi then vi ← vj
11: second-set← second-set ∪ {j}
12: when |second-set| = n−f for the first
time
13: return LSB(vi)
is arbitrarily filled with n− f ones and f zeros. Thus, the total number of ones in the table
is n(n− f) and the total number of zeros is nf . Let k be the number of columns with at
least 2f + 1 ones. Because each column represents a value and out of the 2f + 1 ones at least
f + 1 represent correct processes that receive this value, c ≥ k. Denote by x the number of
ones in the remaining columns. Because each column has at most n ones we get:
x ≥ n(n− f)− kn. (1)
And because the remaining columns have at most 2f ones:
x ≤ 2f(n− k). (2)
Combining (1), (2) we get:
2f(n− k) ≥ n(n− f)− kn
2fn− 2fk ≥ n2 − fn− kn
(n− 2f)k ≥ n2 − 3fn
k ≥ n(n− 3f)
n− 2f .
Because f = ( 13 − )n we get:
c ≥ k ≥ n(n− 3(
1
3 − )n)
n− 2( 13 − )n
= n(1− 1 + 3)
1− 23 + 2
= 91 + 6n, as required.
J
Let vmin , min
pi∈Π
{V RFi(r)}. We prove that with a constant probability, it is common.
I Lemma 4. Prob[vmin is common] ≥ cn − 13 + .
Proof. Notice that we assume that the invocation of shared_coin(r) by each process is
causally independent of its progress at other processes. Hence, for any two processes pi, pj ,
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the messages 〈first, vi〉, 〈first, vj〉 are causally concurrent. Thus, due to our delayed-
adaptive adversary definition, these messages are scheduled by the adversary regardless of
their content, namely their VRF random values. Notice that the adversary can corrupt
processes before they initially send their VRF values. Since the adversary cannot predict the
VRF outputs of the processes, the probability that the process holding vmin is corrupted before
sending its first messages is at most fn . The adversary is oblivious to the correct processes’
VRF values when it schedules their first phase messages. Therefore, each of them has the
same probability to become common. Since at most f common values originate at Byzantine
processes, this probability is at least c−fn−f . We conclude that vmin is common with probability
at least (1− fn ) c−fn−f = (1−
( 13−)n
n )
c−( 13−)n
n−( 13−)n
= ( 23 + )
c−( 13−)n
( 23+)n
= c−(
1
3−)n
n =
c
n − 13 + .
J
We next observe that if vmin is common, then it is shared by all processes.
I Lemma 5. If vmin is common then each correct process holds vmin at the end of phase 2.
Proof. Since vmin is common, at least f + 1 correct processes receive it by the end of phase
1 and update their local values to vmin. During the second phase, each correct process hears
from n− f processes. This means that it hears from at least one correct process that has
updated its value to vmin and sent it. J
I Lemma 6. The coin’s success rate is at least 182+24−16(1+6) .
Proof. We bound the probability that all correct processes output b ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
Prob[all correct processes output b ] ≥ Prob[all correct processes have the same vi at the
end of phase 2 and its LSB is b] ≥ Prob[all correct processes have vi = vmin at the end of
phase 2 and its LSB is b] = 12 · Prob[all correct processes have vi = vmin at the end of phase
2]
Lemma 5≥ 12 · Prob[vmin is common]
Lemma 4≥ 12 ( cn − 13 + )
Lemma 3≥ 182+24−16(1+6) .
J
I Remark 7. Notice that for  = 13 (i.e., f = 0) it holds that the coin’s success rate is
1
2 and
we get a perfect fair coin.
We have shown a bound on the coin’s success rate in terms of . Since  > 0.217, the
coin’s success rate is a positive constant. We next prove that the coin ensures liveness.
I Lemma 8. If all correct processes invoke Algorithm 1 then all correct processes return.
Proof. All correct processes send their messages in the first phase. As up to f processes
may be faulty, each correct process eventually receives n− f 〈first, x〉 messages and sends
a message in the second phase. As n− f correct processes send their messages, each correct
process eventually receives n− f 〈second, x〉 messages and returns. J
From Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 we conclude:
I Theorem 9. Algorithm 1 implements a shared coin with success rate at least 182+24−16(1+6) .
Complexity. In each shared coin instance all correct processes send two messages to all
other processes. Each of these messages contains one VRF output (including a value and a
proof), in addition to a constant number of bits that identify the message’s type. Therefore,
each message’s size is a constant number of words and the total word complexity of a shared
coin instance is O(n2).
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We have presented a new shared coin in the asynchronous model that uses a VRF. This
coin can be incorporated into the Byzantine Agreement algorithm of Mostefaoui et al. [26],
to yield an asynchronous binary Byzantine Agreement with resilience f = ( 13 − )n, a word
complexity of O(n2), and O(1) expected time.
5 Committees
5.1 Validated committee sampling
With the aim of reducing the number of messages and achieving sub-quadratic word com-
plexity, it is common to avoid all-to-all communication phases [17, 19]. Instead, a subset
of processes is sampled to a committee and only processes elected to the committee send
messages. As committees are randomly sampled, preventing the adversary from corrupting
their members, each committee member cannot predict the next committee sample and send
its message to all other processes. Potentially, if the committee is sufficiently small, this
technique allow committee-based protocols to result in sub-quadratic word complexity.
Validated committee sampling is a primitive that allows processes to elect committees
without communication and later prove their election. It provides every process pi with
a private function samplei(s, λ), which gets a string s and a threshold 1 ≤ λ ≤ n and
returns a tuple 〈vi, σi〉, where vi ∈ {true, false} and σi is a proof that vi = samplei(s, λ). If
vi = true we say that pi is sampled to the committee for s and λ. The primitive ensures
that pi is sampled with probability λn . In addition, there is a public (known to all) function,
committee-val(s, λ, i, σi), which gets a string s, a threshold λ, a process identification i and a
proof σi, and returns true or false.
Consider a string s. For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let 〈vi, σi〉 be the return value of samplei(s, λ).
The following is satisfied for every pi:
committee-val(s, λ, i, σi) = vi.
If pi is correct, then it is infeasible for the adversary to compute samplei(s, λ).
It is infeasible for the adversary to find 〈v, σ〉 s.t. v 6= vi and committee-val(s, λ, i, σ) =
true.
We refer to the set of processes sampled to the committee for s and λ as C(s, λ). In this
paper we set λ to ln(n). Let d be a parameter of the system such that max{ 1λ , 0.0362} < d < 6 .
Our committee-based protocols can no longer wait for n− f processes. Instead, they wait
for W ,
⌈
( 23 + 3d)λ
⌉
processes. We show that whp at least W processes will be correct in
each committee sample and hence waiting for this number does not compromise liveness. In
addition, instead of assuming f Byzantine processes, our committee-based protocols assume
that whp the number of Byzantine processes in each committee is at most B ,
⌊
( 13 − d)λ
⌋
.
The following claim is proven in Appendix A using Chernoff bounds.
B Claim 10. For a string s and 1 ≤ λ ≤ n the following hold with high probability:
(S1) |C(s, λ)| ≤ (1 + d)λ.
(S2) |C(s, λ)| ≥ (1− d)λ.
(S3) At least W processes in C(s, λ) are correct.
(S4) At most B processes in C(s, λ) are Byzantine.
If a protocol uses a constant number of committees, then with high probability, Claim 10
holds for all of them. If, however, a protocol uses a polynomial number of committees then
it does not guarantee the properties of this claim. The following corollaries are derived from
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Claim 10 and are used to ensure the safety and liveness properties of our protocols that use
committees (a full proof is in Appendix A). Intuitively, S3 allows the protocol to wait for W
messages without forgoing liveness. Property S5 below shows that if two processes wait for
sets P1 and P2 of this size, then they hear from at least B + 1 common processes of which,
by S4, at least one is correct.
I Corollary 11 (S5). Consider C(s, λ) for some string s and some 1 ≤ λ ≤ n and two sets
P1, P2 ⊂ C(s, λ) s.t |P1| = |P2| = W . Then, |P1 ∩ P2| ≥ B + 1.
The following property is used to show that if B + 1 correct processes hold some value,
and some correct process waits for messages from W processes, then it hears from at least
one correct process that holds this value.
I Corollary 12 (S6). Consider C(s, λ) for some string s and some 1 ≤ λ ≤ n and two sets
P1, P2 ⊂ C(s, λ) s.t |P1| = B + 1 and |P2| = W . Then, |P1 ∩ P2| ≥ 1.
5.2 WHP Coin
We now employ committee sampling to reduce the word complexity of our shared coin. Our
new protocol is called whp_coin. As before, we assume that for every r ∈ N, the invocation
of whp_coin(r) by some process p is causally independent of its progress at other processes.
We now define the WHP coin abstraction:
I Definition 13 (WHP Coin). A WHP coin with success rate ρ is a shared object exposing
whp_coin(r), r ∈ N at each process. If all correct processes invoke whp_coin(r) then, whp
(1) all correct processes return, and (2) all of them output the same value b with probability
at least ρ, for any value b ∈ {0, 1}.
The whp_coin protocol is presented in Algorithm 2. It samples two committees, one for
each communication step. In each step, only the processes that are sampled to the committee
send messages. However, since the committee samples are unpredictable, messages are sent
to all processes. With committees, processes can no longer wait for n− f messages. Instead
they wait for W messages. Since a constant number of committees is sampled in the protocol,
Claim 10 holds for all of them and by S3, all processes receive W messages, ensuring liveness.
In Appendix B we adapt the coin’s correctness proof given in Section 4 to the committee-
based protocol, proving the following theorem:
I Theorem 14. Algorithm 2 implements a WHP coin with a constant success rate.
Complexity. In each whp_coin instance using committees all correct processes that
are sampled to the two committees (lines 2,6) send messages to all other processes. Each of
these messages contains a VRF output (including a value and a proof), a VRF proof of the
sender’s election to the committe and a constant number of bits that identify the type of
message that is sent. Therefore, each message’s size is a constant number of words and the
total word complexity of a WHP coin instance is O(nC) where C is the number of processes
that are sampled to the committees. Since each process is sampled to a committee with
probability 1λ , we get a word complexity of O(nλ) = O(nlog(n)) = O˜(n) in expectation.
6 Asynchronous sub-quadratic Byzantine Agreement
We adapt the Byzantine Agreement algorithm of Mostefaoui et al. [26] to work with commit-
tees. Our protocol leverages an approver abstraction, which we implement in Section 6.1
and then integrate it into a Byzantine Agreement protocol in Section 6.2.
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Algorithm 2 Protocol whp_coin(r): code for process pi
1: Initially first-set, second-set = ∅, vi =∞
2: if samplei(first, λ) = true then
3: vi ← VRFi(r)
4: send 〈first, vi〉 to all processes
5: upon receiving 〈first, vj〉 with valid
vj
from validly sampled pj do
6: if samplei(second, λ) then
7: if vj < vi then vi ← vj
8: first-set ← first-set ∪{j}
9: when |first-set| = W for the first
time
10: send 〈second, vi)〉 to all pro-
cesses
11: upon receiving 〈second, vj〉 with
valid vj
from validly sampled pj do
12: if vj < vi then vi ← vj
13: second-set ← second-set ∪{j}
14: when |second-set| = W for the first
time
15: return LSB(vi)
6.1 Approver abstraction
The approver abstraction is an adaptation of the Synchronized Binary-Value Broadcast
(SBV-broadcast) primitive in [26]. It provides processes with the procedure approve(v), which
takes a value v as an input and returns a set of values.
I Assumption 1. Correct processes invoke the approver with at most 2 different values.
Under this assumption, an approver satisfies the following:
I Definition 15 (Approver). In an approver instance the following properties hold whp:
Validity. If all correct processes invoke approve(v) then the only possible return value of
correct processes is {v}.
Graded Agreement. If a correct process pi returns {v} and another correct process pj
returns {w} then v = w.
Termination. If all correct processes invoke approve then approve returns with a non-empty
set at all of them.
Our approver uses different committees for different message types, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Importantly, the protocol satisfies the so-called process replaceability [17] property, whereby
a correct process selected for a committee C broadcasts at most one message in its role as a
member of C. Thus, our delayed-adaptive adversary can learn of a process’s membership in
a committee only after that process ceases to partake in the committee. This allows us to
leverage the sampling analysis in the previous section. For clarity of the presentation, we
discuss the algorithm here under the assumption that properties S1-S6 hold for all sampled
committees. As shown above, these hold whp for each committee, and the algorithm employs
a constant number of committees, so they hold for all of them whp.
The approver’s pseudo-code appears in Algorithm 3. It consists of three phases – init,
echo, and ok. In each phase, committee members broadcast to all processes. Messages are
validated to originate from legitimate committee members using the committee-val primitive;
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Figure 1 Committees sampled in Algorithm 3.
this validation is omitted from the pseudo-code for clarity. In the first phase, each init
committee member broadcasts its input value to all processes.
The role of the echo phase is to “boost” values sent by sufficiently many processes in the
init phase, and make sure that all correct processes receive them. “Sufficiently many” here
means at least B + 1, which by S4 includes at least one correct process. Ensuring process
replaceability in the echo phase is a bit tricky, since committee members must echo every
value they receive from least B + 1 processes, and there might be two such values. (Recall
that we assume that correct processes invoke the protocol with at most two different values,
so there cannot be more than two values that exceed this threshold). To ensure that each
committee member broadcasts at most once, we sample a different committee for each value.
That is, the value v is part of the string passed to the sample function for this phase.
When a member of the ok committee receives 〈echo, v〉 messages from W different
members of the same echo committee for the first time, it broadcasts an 〈ok, v〉 message.
Note that the process sends an ok message only for the first value that exceeds this threshold.
An 〈ok, v〉 message includes, as proof of its validity, W signed 〈echo, v〉 messages. Again,
the proof and its validation are omitted from the pseudo-code for clarity. Once a correct
process receives W valid ok messages, it returns the set of values in these messages.
Algorithm 3 Protocol approve(vi): code for process pi
1: if samplei(init, λ) = true then broadcast 〈init, vi〉
2: upon receiving 〈init, v〉 from B + 1 different processes do
3: if samplei(〈echo, v〉, λ) = true then broadcast 〈echo, v〉
4: upon receiving 〈echo, v〉 from W different processes do
5: if samplei(ok, λ) = true ∧ haven’t sent any 〈ok, ∗〉 message then
6: broadcast 〈ok, v〉
7: upon receiving 〈ok, ∗〉 from W different processes do
8: return the set of values received in these messages
We next prove that Algorithm 3 implements an approver. The following three lemmas
are stated here and their proofs appear in Appendix C:
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I Lemma 16 (Validity). If all correct processes invoke approve(v) then the only possible
return value of correct processes is {v} whp.
I Lemma 17 (Graded Agreement). If a correct process pi returns {v} and another correct
process pj returns {w} then v = w whp.
I Lemma 18 (Termination). If all correct processes invoke approve then at every correct
process approve returns with a non-empty set whp.
From Lemmas 16,17,18, we conclude the following theorem:
I Theorem 19. Algorithm 3 implements an approver.
Complexity. In each approver instance correct processes that are sampled to the
four committees (lines 1,3,5) send messages to all other processes. The committee size is
O(λ) = O(log(n)) whp. Messages contain values, VRF proofs of the sender’s election to
the committee, signatures of O(λ) committee members, and a constant number of bits that
identify the type of message that is sent. Therefore, each message’s size is at most O(λ) words
and the total word complexity of a shared coin instance is O(nλ2) = O(nlog2(n)) = O˜(n) in
expectation. The λ2 appears in the expression due to the signatures of O(λ) processes sent
along the ok messages.
6.2 Byzantine Agreement WHP
Our next step is solving Byzantine Agreement whp, formally defined as follows:
I Definition 20 (Byzantine Agreement WHP). In Byzantine Agreement WHP, each correct
process pi ∈ Π proposes a binary input value vi and decide on an output value decisioni s.t.
with high probability the following properties hold:
Validity. If all correct processes propose the same value v, then any correct process that
decides, decides v.
Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently.
Termination. Every correct process eventually decides.
We present the pseudo-code for our algorithm in Algorithm 4. Our protocol executes in
rounds. Each round consists of two approver invocations and one call to the WHP coin. Again,
we discuss the algorithm assuming S1-S6 hold. We will argue that the algorithm decides in
a constant number of rounds whp, and so these properties hold for all the committees it
uses. The local variable esti holds pi’s current estimate of the decision value. The variable
decisioni holds pi’s irrevocable decision. It is initialized to ⊥ and set to a value in {0, 1} at
most once. Every process pi begins by setting esti to hold its initial value. At the beginning
of each round processes execute the approver with their est values. If they return a singleton
{v}, they choose to invoke the next approver with v as their proposal and otherwise they
invoke the next approver with ⊥. By the approver’s graded agreement property, different
processes do not return different singletons. Thus, at most two different values (⊥ and one in
{0, 1}) are given as an input by correct processes to the next approver, satisfying Assumption
1.
At this point, after all correct processes have chosen their proposals, they all invoke the
WHP coin in line 8 in order to select a fall-back value. Notice that executing the WHP coin
protocol after proposals have been set prevents the adversary from biasing proposals based
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on the coin flip. Then, in in line 9, all processes invoke the approver with their proposals. If
a process does not receive ⊥ in its return set, it can safely decide the value it received. It
does so by updating its decision variable in line 13. If it receives some value other than ⊥ it
adopts it to be its estimated value (line 18), whereas if it receives only ⊥, it adopts the coin
flip (line 16). If all processes receive ⊥ in line 4 then the probability that they all adopt the
same value is at least 2ρ, where ρ is the coin’s success rate. If some processes receive v, then
the probability that all the processes that adopt the coin flip adopt v is at least ρ. With high
probability, after a constant number of rounds, all correct processes have the same estimated
value. By validity of the approver, once they all have common estimate, they decide upon it
within 1 round.
Algorithm 4 Protocol Byzantine Agreement(vi): code for process pi
1: esti ← vi
2: decisioni ← ⊥
3: for r = 0, 1, ... do
4: vals← approve(esti)
5: if vals = {v} for some v then
6: proposei ← v
7: otherwise proposei ← ⊥
8: c← whp_coin(r)
9: props← approve(proposei)
10: if props = {v} for some v 6= ⊥ then
11: esti ← v
12: if decisioni = ⊥ then
13: decisioni ← v
14: else
15: if props = {⊥} then
16: esti ← c
17: else %props = {v,⊥}
18: esti ← v
We now prove our main theorem:
I Theorem 21. Algorithm 4 when using an approver (Definition 15) and a WHP coin
(Definition 13) solves Byzantine Agreement whp (Definition 20).
We first show that Algorithm 4 satisfies the approver and WHP coin primitives’ as-
sumptions whp. Proving this allows us to use their properties while proving Theorem
21.
I Lemma 22. For every round r of Algorithm 4 the following hold:
1. All correct processes invoke approve with at most 2 different values.
2. The invocation of whp_coin(r) by a correct process p is causally independent of its progress
at other processes.
Proof. 1. It is easy to see, by induction on the number of rounds, that since the processes’
inputs are binary and we use a binary coin, the est of all processes is in {0, 1} at the
beginning of each round. Hence, the approver in line 4 is invoked with at most two
different values. Due to its graded agreement property, all processes that update their
propose to v 6= ⊥ in line 6 update it to the same value whp. Thus, whp, in line 9 approver
is invoked with either v or ⊥.
2. Correct processes call whp_coin(r) without waiting for indication that other processes
have done so.
J
Next, we show that for any given round of the algorithm, (1) whp all processes complete
this round, and (2) with a constant probability, they all have the same estimate value by its
end.
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I Lemma 23. If all correct processes begin round r of Algorithm 4 then whp:
1. All correct processes complete round r, i.e. they’re not blocked during round r.
2. With probability greater than ρ, where ρ is the success rate of the WHP coin, all correct
processes have the same est value at the end of round r.
Proof. First, if all correct processes begin round r then they all invoke the approver in line
4. Their invocation returns whp so they all invoke the coin in line 8, and so it returns and
all invoke approve in line 9, and so it also returns, proving (1). To show (2), consider the
possible scenarios with respect to the approver’s return value:
All correct processes return singletons in line 4:
By the approver’s graded agreement, whp they return {v} with the same value v. Hence,
all correct processes update their propose to v. Then, they all execute approve(v) in line
9, and by validity, they all return {v} whp. In this case they all update est← v.
All correct processes return {0, 1} in line 4:
All correct processes update their propose value to ⊥. Then, they all execute approve(⊥)
in line 9, and by validity, they return {⊥} whp. In this case, all correct processes then
update their estimate value to the coin flip (line 16). With probability at least 2ρ all
correct processes toss the same v ∈ {0, 1}.
Some, but not all correct processes return singletons in line 4:
By graded agreement, all singletons hold the same value v. Thus, all correct processes
propose v or ⊥ and by validity return {v}, {v,⊥}, or {⊥} in line 9. We examine two
possible complementary sub-cases:
If some correct process returns {v} in line 9: By approver’s graded agreement, no
correct process returns {⊥} in line 9, whp. Thus, whp, all correct processes update
their estimate value to v (in line 11 or 18).
If no correct process return {v} in line 9: All correct processes returns {v,⊥} or {⊥}
in line 9. All correct processes either update their estimate value to the coin flip of the
WHP coin (line 16) or to v (line 18). Since the value v is determined before tossing
the coin, the adversary cannot bias v after viewing the coin flip and with probability
at least ρ all correct processes that adopt the coin’s value toss v.
In all cases, with probability greater than ρ all correct processes have the same est value
at the end of r, whp. J
The following lemmas indicate that the Byzantine Agreement whp properties are satisfied,
which completes the proof of Theorem 21.
I Lemma 24. (Validity) If at the beginning of round r of Algorithm 4 all correct processes
have the same estimate value v, then whp any correct process that has not decided before
decides v in round r.
Proof. If all correct processes start round r then by Lemma 23 they all complete round r.
Since they all being with the same estimate value v, they all execute approve(v) in line 4.
Hence, by approver’s validity and termination, whp they all return the non-empty set {v}
and update their propose values to v. Then, they all execute approve(v) for the second time
in line 9, and due to the same reason, they all return {v} whp. Any correct process that has
not decided before decides v in line 13. J
I Lemma 25. (Termination) Every correct process decides whp.
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Proof. By Lemma 23, for every round r of Algorithm 4, with probability greater than ρ,
where ρ is the success rate of the WHP coin, all correct processes have the same est value at
the end of r whp. Hence, by Lemma 24, with probability greater than ρ, all correct processes
decide by round r + 1 whp. It follows that the expected number of rounds until all processes
decide is bounded by 1ρ , which is constant. Thus, by Chebyshev’s inequality, whp all correct
processes decide within a constant number of rounds. J
I Lemma 26. (Agreement) No two correct processes decide different values whp.
Proof. Let r be the first round in which some process pi decides on some value v ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, pi’s invocation to approver in line 9 of round r returns {v}. If another correct process
pj decides w in round r then its approver call in line 9 of round r returns {w}. By approver’s
graded agreement, v = w whp. Consider a correct process pk that does not decide in round
r. By the definition of r, pk hasn’t decided in any round r′ < r. By approver’s graded
agreement, whp, pk returns {v,⊥} in line 9 of round r, and pk updates its estk value to v
in line 18. It follows that whp all correct processes have v as their estimate value at the
beginning of round r+ 1. By Lemma 24, every correct process that has not decided in round
r decides v in round r + 1 whp. J
Complexity. In each round of the protocol, all correct processes invoke two approver
calls and one WHP coin instance. Due to the constant success rate of the WHP coin,
the expected number of rounds before all correct processes decide is constant. Thus, due
to the word complexity of the WHP coin and approver, the expected word complexity is
O(nlog2(n)) = O˜(n) and the time complexity is O(1) in expectation.
7 Conclusions and Future Directions
We have presented the first sub-quadratic asynchronous Byzantine Agreement algorithm. To
construct the algorithm, we introduced two techniques. First, we presented a shared coin
algorithm that requires a trusted PKI and uses VRFs. Second, we formalized VRF-based
committee sampling in the asynchronous model for the first time.
Our algorithm solves Byzantine Agreement with high probability. It would be interesting
to understand whether some of the problem’s properties can be satisfied with probability 1,
while keeping the sub-quadratic communication cost. In addition, in order to achieve the
constant success rate of the coin and guarantee the committees’ properties, we bounded 
from below by a constant. This bound prevented us from achieving optimal resilience. The
question whether it is possible to relax this bound to allow better resilience remains open.
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Appendix A Sampling proofs
B Claim 27. For a string s and 1 ≤ λ ≤ n the following hold with high probability:
(S1) |C(s, λ)| ≤ (1 + d)λ.
(S2) |C(s, λ)| ≥ (1− d)λ.
(S3) At least W processes in C(s, λ) are correct.
(S4) At most B processes in C(s, λ) are Byzantine.
Proof. Recall that d is a parameter of the system such that max{ 1λ , 0.0362} < d < 6 .
In order to prove these properties we use two Chernoff bounds:
Suppose X1, ..., Xn are independent random variables taking values in {0, 1}. Let X
denote their sum and let E[X] denote the sum’s expected value.
∀0 ≤ δ : Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)E[X]] ≤ e− δ
2E[X]
2+δ (3)
∀0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 : Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)E[X]] ≤ e− δ
2E[X]
2 (4)
I Lemma 28 (S1). |C(s, λ)| ≤ (1 + d)λ whp.
Proof. Let X be a random variable that represents the number of processes that are sampled
to C(s, λ). X ∼ Bin(n, ln(n)n ), thus E[X] = ln(n).
Placing δ = d ≥ 0 in 3 we get:
Pr[X ≥ (1 + d)ln(n)] ≤ e− d
2ln(n)
2+d .
Denote by c1 the constant d
2
2+d . We get:
Pr[X ≥ (1 + d)ln(n)] ≤ e−c1ln(n).
Thus,
Pr[X < (1 + d)ln(n)] = Pr[X < (1 + d)λ] > 1− 1
ec1ln(n)
= 1− 1
nc1
.
J
I Lemma 29 (S2). |C(s, λ)| ≥ (1− d)λ whp.
Proof. Let X be a random variable that represents the number of processes that are sampled
to C(s, λ). X ∼ Bin(n, ln(n)n ), thus E[X] = ln(n).
Placing δ = d it holds that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 in 4 and we get:
Pr[X ≥ (1− d)ln(n)] ≤ e− d
2ln(n)
2 .
Denote by c2 the constant d
2
2 . We get:
Pr[X ≥ (1− d)ln(n)] ≤ e−c2ln(n).
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Thus,
Pr[X < (1− d)ln(n)] = Pr[X < (1− d)λ] > 1− 1
ec2ln(n)
= 1− 1
nc2
.
J
I Lemma 30 (S3). At least W processes in C(s, λ) are correct whp.
Proof. Let X be a random variable that represents the number of correct processes that are
sampled to C(s, λ). X ∼ Bin(( 23 + )n, ln(n)n ), thus E[X] = ( 23 + )ln(n). Let d′ = 3d+ 1λ .
Notice that 1 − 23+d′2
3+
≤ 1 and also 1 − 23+d′2
3+
= 1 − 23+3d+ 1λ2
3+
=
2
3+− 23−3d− 1λ
2
3+
≥ − 2− 1λ2
3+
≥ 0.
Hence, we can put δ = 1− 23+d′2
3+
in (4) and get:
Pr[X ≤ (1− (1−
2
3 + d′
2
3 + 
))(23 + )ln(n)] ≤ e
−
(1−
2
3+d
′
2
3+
)2( 23+)ln(n)
2 ,
P r[X ≤ (
2
3 + d′
2
3 + 
)(23 + )ln(n)] ≤ e
−
(1−
2
3+d
′
2
3+
)2( 23+)ln(n)
2 ,
P r[X ≤ (23 + d
′)ln(n)] ≤ e−
(1−
2
3+d
′
2
3+
)2( 23+)ln(n)
2 .
Denote by c3 the constant
(1−
2
3+d
′
2
3+
)2( 23+)
2 . We get:
Pr[X ≤ (23 + d
′)ln(n)] ≤ e−c3ln(n).
Thus,
Pr[X > (23 + d
′)ln(n)] = Pr[X > (23 + d
′)λ] > 1− 1
ec3ln(n)
= 1− 1
nc3
.
To this point we’ve proved that at least ( 23 + d′)λ processes in C(s, λ) are correct whp. It
follows that at least ( 23 + 3d+
1
λ )λ = (
2
3 + 3d)λ+ 1 processes in C(s, λ) are correct whp.
As
⌈
( 23 + 3d)λ
⌉ ≤ ( 23 + 3d)λ+ 1 we conclude that at least W = ⌈( 23 + 3d)λ⌉ processes in
C(s, λ) are correct whp.
J
I Lemma 31 (S4). At most B processes in C(s, λ) are Byzantine whp.
Proof. Let X be a random variable that represents the number of Byzantine processes that
are sampled to C(s, λ). X ∼ Bin(( 13 − )n, ln(n)n ), thus E[X] = (13 − )ln(n).
Placing δ = −d1
3−
≥ 0 in (3) we get:
Pr[X ≥ (1 + − d1
3 − 
)(13 − )ln(n)] ≤ e
−
( −d1
3−
)2( 13−)ln(n)
2+( −d1
3−
)
,
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Pr[X ≥ (
1
3 − d
1
3 − 
)(13 − )ln(n)] ≤ e
−
(−d)2
1
3−
ln(n)
2+( −d1
3−
)
,
P r[X ≥ (13 − d)ln(n)] ≤ e
−
(−d)2
1
3−
ln(n)
2+( −d1
3−
)
.
Denote by c4 the constant
(−d)2
1
3−
2+( −d1
3−
) . We get:
Pr[X ≥ (13 − d)ln(n)] ≤ e
−c4ln(n).
Thus,
Pr[X < (13 − d)ln(n)] = Pr[X < (
1
3 − d)λ] > 1−
1
ec4ln(n)
= 1− 1
nc4
.
Since X must be an integer, it follows that X ≤ B = ⌊( 13 − d)λ⌋ whp.
J
J
I Corollary 32 (S5). Consider C(s, λ) for some string s and some 1 ≤ λ ≤ n and two sets
P1, P2 ⊂ C(s, λ) s.t |P1| = |P2| = W . Then, |P1 ∩ P2| ≥ B + 1.
Proof. The set P2 contains at most |C(s, λ) \ P1| processes that aren’t in P1. By S1, and
since P1 ⊂ C(s, λ):
|C(s, λ)\P1| ≤ (1+d)λ−W = (1+d)λ−
⌈
(23 + 3d)λ
⌉
≤ (1+d)λ−(23 +3d)λ = (
1
3 −2d)λ.
The remaining processes in P2 are also in P1, so
|P1∩P2| ≥W −(13−2d)λ =
⌈
(23 + 3d)λ
⌉
−(13−2d)λ ≥ (
2
3 +3d)λ−(
1
3−2d)λ = (
1
3 +5d)λ.
Finally,
|P1 ∩ P2| −B = |P1 ∩ P2| −
⌊
(13 − d)λ
⌋
≥ (13 + 5d)λ− (
1
3 − d)λ = 6dλ >
6λ
λ
≥ 1,
as requested. J
I Corollary 33 (S6). Consider C(s, λ) for some string s and some 1 ≤ λ ≤ n and two sets
P1, P2 ⊂ C(s, λ) s.t |P1| = B + 1 and |P2| = W . Then, |P1 ∩ P2| ≥ 1.
Proof. The set P2 contains at most |C(s, λ) \ P1| processes that aren’t in P1. By S1, and
since P1 ⊂ C(s, λ):
|C(s, λ)\P1| ≤ (1+d)λ−(B+1) = (1+d)λ−(
⌊
(13 − d)λ
⌋
+1) ≤ (1+d)λ−((13−d)λ−1)−1 = (
2
3+2d)λ.
Therefore,
|P2|−|C(s, λ)\P1| ≥W−(23+2d)λ =
⌈
(23 + 3d)λ
⌉
−(23+2d)λ ≥ (
2
3 + 3d)λ−(
2
3+2d)λ = dλ >
λ
λ
= 1,
and so |P1 ∩ P2| ≥ 1, as requested. J
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Appendix B WHP Coin Proofs
In the committee-based protocol, a value v is common if at least B + 1 correct processes in
C(second, λ) have vi = v at the end of phase 1. The next lemma adapts the lower bound of
Lemma 3 on the number of common values to the committee-based protocol.
I Lemma 34. In Algorithm 2 whp, c ≥ d(11−3d)1+9d λ.
Proof. Let n1 = |C(first, λ)|, n2 = |C(second, λ)|. We define a table T with n2 rows and
n1 columns. For each correct process pi ∈ C(second, λ) and each 0 ≤ j ≤ n1 − 1, T [i, j] = 1
iff pi receives 〈first, v〉 from pj ∈ P1 before sending the second message in line 10. Each
row of a correct process contains exactly W ones since it waits for W 〈first, v〉 messages
(line 9). Each row of a faulty process in C(second, λ) is arbitrarily filled with W ones and
n1 −W zeros. Thus the total number of ones in the table is n2W and the total number
of zeros is n2(n1 −W ). Let k be the number of columns with at least 2B + 1 ones. Each
column represents a value sent by a process in C(first, λ). By S4, whp, at most B of the
processes that receive this value are Byzantine. Thus, whp, out of any 2B + 1 ones in each
of these columns, at least B + 1 represent correct processes that receive this value and it
follows that c ≥ k.
Denote by x the number of ones in the remaining columns. Because each column has at
most n2 ones we get:
x ≥ n2W − kn2 = n2
⌈
(23 + 3d)λ
⌉
− kn2 ≥ n2(23 + 3d)λ− kn2. (5)
And because the remaining columns have at most 2B ones:
x ≤ 2B(n1 − k) = 2
⌊
(13 − d)λ
⌋
(n1 − k) ≤ 2(13 − d)λ(n1 − k). (6)
Combining (1), (2) we get:
2(13 − d)λ(n1 − k) ≥ n2(
2
3 + 3d)λ− kn2
kn2 − 2λk(13 − d) ≥ n2(
2
3 + 3d)λ− 2(
1
3 − d)λn1
k(n2 − 2λ(13 − d)) ≥ λ(n2(
2
3 + 3d)− 2(
1
3 − d)n1)
k ≥ λ(n2(
2
3 + 3d)− 2( 13 − d)n1)
n2 − 2λ( 13 − d)
By S2 for C(second, λ), whp n2 ≥ (1− d)λ and we get:
k ≥ λ((1− d)λ(
2
3 + 3d)− 2( 13 − d)n1)
n2 − 2λ( 13 − d)
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By S1 for C(first, λ) and C(second, λ), whp n1, n2 ≤ (1 + d)λ and we get:
k ≥
λ
[
(1− d)λ( 23 + 3d)− 2( 13 − d)(1 + d)λ
]
(1 + d)λ− 2λ( 13 − d)
=
λ
[
(1− d)( 23 + 3d)− 2( 13 − d)(1 + d)
]
(1 + d)− 2( 13 − d)
Finally, we get whp:
c ≥ k ≥ d(11− 3d)1 + 9d λ.
as required.
J
Let vmin , min
pi∈C(first,λ)
{V RFi(r)}. Similiarly to Lemma 4, we prove that with a constant
probability it is common, whp.
I Lemma 35. whp Prob[vmin is common] ≥ 23(1−d) · c−B(1+d)λ−B .
Proof. Notice that we assume that the invocation of whp_coin(r) by every process is
causally independent of its progress at other processes. Hence, for any two processes
pi, pj ∈ C(first, λ), the messages 〈first, vi〉, 〈first, vj〉 are causally concurrent. Thus, due
to our delayed-adaptive adversary definition, these messages are scheduled by the adversary
regardless of their content, namely their VRF random values. Notice that the adversary can
corrupt processes before they initially send their VRF values. By S4 there are at most B
Byzantine processes in C(first, λ). Since the adversary cannot predict the VRF outputs, the
probability for a given process to be corrupted before sending its first messages is at most
B
|C(first,λ)| . The adversary is oblivious to the correct processes’ VRF values when it schedules
their first phase messages. Therefore, each of them has the same probability to become
common. Since at most B common values are from Byzantine processes, this probability
is at least c−B|C(first,λ)|−B . We conclude that vmin is common with probability at least
(1− B|C(first,λ)| ) c−B|C(first,λ)|−B . By S1 and S2 we get that (1− d)λ ≤ |C(first, λ)| ≤ (1 + d)λ
whp.
Thus, whp, vmin is common with probability at least (1 − B(1−d)λ ) c−B(1+d)λ−B = (1 −
b( 13−d)λc
(1−d)λ )
c−B
(1+d)λ−B ≥ (1−
( 13−d)λ
(1−d)λ )
c−B
(1+d)λ−B =
2
3(1−d) · c−B(1+d)λ−B .
J
I Lemma 36. If vmin is common then whp each correct process holds vmin at the end of
phase 2.
Proof. Since vmin is common, at least B + 1 correct members of C(second, λ) receive it
by the end of phase 1 and update their local values to vmin. During the second phase, each
correct process hears fromW members of C(second, λ) whp. By S6, this means that it hears
from at least one correct process that has updated its value to vmin and sent it whp. J
I Lemma 37. The coin’s success rate is at least 18d2+27d−13(5+6d)(1−d)(1+9d) , whp.
Proof. Denote n1 = |C(first, λ)|. We bound whp the probability that all correct processes
output b ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
Prob[all correct processes output b] ≥ Prob[all correct processes have the same vi at the
end of phase 2 and its LSB is b] ≥ Prob[all correct processes have vi = vmin at the end
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of phase 2 and its LSB is b] = 12 · Prob[all correct processes have vi = vmin]
Lemma 36≥
1
2 · Prob[vmin is common]
Lemma 35≥ 12 · 23(1−d) · c−B(1+d)λ−B
Lemma 34≥ 13(1−d) ·
d(11−3d)
1+9d λ−B
(1+d)λ−B =
1
3(1−d) ·
d(11−3d)
1+9d λ−b( 13−d)λc
(1+d)λ−b( 13−d)λc ≥
1
3(1−d) ·
d(11−3d)
1+9d λ−( 13−d)λ
(1+d)λ−(( 13−d)λ−1)
= 13(1−d) ·
λ 18d
2+27d−1
27d+3
λ( 23+2d)+1
≥ 13(1−d) ·
λ 18d
2+27d−1
27d+3
λ( 23+2d)+λ
= 18d2+27d−13(5+6d)(1−d)(1+9d) .
J
We have shown a bound on the coin’s success rate whp. Since d > 0.0362, the coin’s
success rate is a positive constant whp. We next prove that the coin ensures liveness whp.
I Lemma 38. If all correct processes invoke Algorithm 2 then all correct processes return
whp.
Proof. All correct processes in C(first, λ) send their message in the first phase. At least
W of them are correct whp by S3. All correct processes in C(second, λ) eventually receive
W 〈first, x〉 messages whp and send a message in the second phase. As ,whp, again W
correct processes send their messages (by S3), each correct process eventually receives W
〈second, x〉 messages and returns whp. J
From Lemma 37 and Lemma 38 we conclude:
I Theorem 14. Algorithm 2 implements a WHP coin with a constant success rate.
Appendix C Approver proofs
I Lemma 39 (Validity). If all correct processes invoke approve(v) then the only possible
return value of correct processes is {v} whp.
Proof. By Claim 10 S4 holds whp for the four sampled committees. It remains to show
that S4 implies validity. Since by S4 the number of Byzantine processes sampled to the init
committee in line 1 is at most B, no process receives B + 1 messages with a value w 6= v.
Thus, no correct process echoes 〈echo, w〉 in line 3. Because the number of Byzantine
processes in C(〈echo, w〉, λ) in line 3 is also at most B, no correct process receives more than
B 〈echo, w〉 messages. As a result, since B < W , no 〈ok, w〉 message is sent by any correct
process. Since ok messages carry proofs, no Byzantine process can send a valid 〈ok, w〉 either.
Therefore, the only possible value in the ok messages is v, and no other value is returned. J
I Lemma 40 (Graded Agreement). If a correct process pi returns {v} and another correct
process pj returns {w} then v = w whp.
Proof. By Claim 10 and Corollary 11, S4 and S5 hold whp for the four sampled committees.
We show that S4 and S5 imply graded agreement. Assume pi returns {v} and pj returns
{w}. Then pi receives W 〈ok, v〉 messages and pj receives W 〈ok, w〉 messages. By S5, two
sets of size W intersect by at least ( 13 − µ)λ+ 1 processes. Hence, since by S4 there are at
most B Byzantine processes in the ok committee, there is at least one correct process pk
whose ok message is received by both pi and pj whp. It follows that pk sends 〈ok, v〉 and
〈ok, w〉. Since every correct process sends at most one ok message (line 5), v = w. J
I Lemma 41 (Termination). If all correct processes invoke approve then at every correct
process approve returns with a non-empty set whp.
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Proof. By Claim 10 S3 holds whp. We show that S3 implies termination. Because all correct
processes invoke approve, every correct init committee member in line 1 sends 〈init, vi〉.
Notice that 12W > (
1
3 − µ)λ ≥ B. Hence, since the number of correct processes in the init
committee is at least W (S3) and correct processes may send at most two different initial
values (Assumption 1), one of them is sent by at least B + 1 correct processes. Denote this
value by v. Every correct process receives this value from B+1 processes, and if it is sampled
to C(〈echo, v〉, λ) in line 3 then it sends it to all other processes. Since C(〈echo, v〉, λ) also
has at least W correct processes (S3), every correct process p receives W 〈echo, v〉 messages.
If p is sampled to the ok committee in line 5 and at this point p has not yet sent an 〈ok, ∗〉
message, it sends one. Since there are at least W correct processes that are sampled to the ok
committee (S3) and they all send ok messages (possibly for different values), every correct
process receives W ok messages and returns the non-empty set of approved values.
J
